

## Degrees of Reality in Plato: Part I<sup>1</sup>

Kozi ASANO

### 1. The Problem

According to traditional interpretations such as found in Cross and Woozley,<sup>2</sup> there is the doctrine of degrees of reality in Plato's philosophy. The doctrine of degrees of reality says that Forms exist while particulars are half existent and half non-existent. If such a doctrine is found in Plato's text, it is found in the argument at the end of the Book V of the *Republic*. But do we find degrees of reality there? If there are degrees of reality, what kind of degrees of reality are they? This is the question which I want to pursue in the present paper. First of all, let us see the context of the argument and the argument itself at the end of the Book V of the *Republic*.

Toward the end of Book V of the *Republic*, when Socrates<sup>3</sup> is asked to explain the possibility of his ideally good state, which is characterized by a kind of communism of the warrior class, he expresses his thought of philosopher-kings as follows:

Unless the philosophers rule as kings or those now called kings and chiefs genuinely and adequately philosophize, and political power and philosophy coincide in the same place, -- there is no rest from ills for the cities, my dear Glaucon, nor I think for human kind, nor will the regime we have now

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<sup>2</sup> Cross and Woozley, *Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary*, Chaps. 7-9.

<sup>3</sup> By Socrates I mean an interlocutor, Socrates, in Plato's *Republic* rather than a historical Socrates.

described in speech ever come forth from nature, insofar as possible, and see the light of the sun. -- in no other city would there be private or public happiness.<sup>4</sup> (473c11-e5)

The philosophers' claim to rule a state is based on their knowledge. What people does Socrates mean by philosophers, however? Philosophers, Socrates says, are lovers of wisdom (475b8-9).<sup>5</sup> The lover of wisdom is "the one who is willing to taste every kind of learning with gusto, and who approaches learning with delight, and is insatiable" (475c6-7). Then Glaucon points out the ambiguity of this definition of philosophers:

Then you'll have many strange ones. For all the lovers of sights are in my opinion what they are because they enjoy learning;<sup>6</sup> and the lovers of hearing would be some of the strangest to include among philosophers, those who

<sup>4</sup> The translation is that by A. Bloom, unless otherwise indicated.

<sup>5</sup> It is important to note that Socrates defines philosophers in terms of love and the objects in which they find pleasure. Philosophers are not lovers of young boys, nor lovers of wine, nor lovers of honor, but lovers of wisdom. Philosophers are contrasted with lovers of honor and lovers of money later in Book IX, and these are the three main types of human beings (580d7-581c4). What one finds pleasure in naturally gives an orientation to one's life. Thus what is essential to philosophers is their love and their way of life. Note what Aristotle says in a similar vein:

We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that ensues on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and he who stands his ground against things that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, while the man who is pained is a coward. For moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains. (*Nicomachean Ethics* II. 2. 1104b3-9. Translated by W. D. Ross.)

So from what one finds pleasure in, we can tell what kind of person one is. See also M. F. Burnyeat's 'Aristotle on Learning to Be Good.'

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I.1. 980a21-24:

All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight.

would never be willing to go voluntarily to a discussion and such occupations but who -- just as though they had hired their ears for hearing -- run around to every chorus at the Dionysia, missing none in the cities or the villages. Will we say that all these men and other learners of such things and the petty arts are philosophers? (475d1-e1)

Socrates answers that the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing are similar to philosophers, but are quite different from them (475e2). How are philosophers different from the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing? What does Socrates mean by learning and wisdom? Socrates says that philosophers are the lovers of the sight of the truth (475e4). Although it is implicit in Socrates' claim that what the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing love is not the truth, what he means by the truth is still unclear.

At this point, Socrates introduces the Theory of Forms, according to which there are on the one hand "fair sounds and colors and shapes and all that craft makes from such things" (476b4-6), which the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing love, and on the other hand the fair (beauty) itself, which philosophers love. The relationship between those many fair things and beauty itself is that the many fair things are likenesses of beauty itself, and the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing, since their thought is limited to likenesses, are dreaming in comparison with philosophers, who are awake, since their thought extends to the original of which the many fair things are likenesses (476c2-d4). The conclusion which Socrates draws from this is that the thought of philosophers is knowledge while that of the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing is opinion (476d5-7). What is implicit in Socrates' claim here is that the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing do not know what they opine (476d9).

Next Socrates tries to persuade the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing of

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I suppose that human beings, and possibly other animals as well, are characterized more or less by this kind of curiosity. Curiosity, which seeks novelty and change, is, however, to be distinguished from wonder, which, Socrates says in the *Theaetetus* (155c8-d5), is the mark of the philosopher.

the correctness of his claim that they do not know but only opine what they opine. Knowledge is related to what is, and ignorance to what is not (476e7-477a10). If there is something such as to be and not to be, it is between what is and what is not (477a6-8). Opinion is between knowledge and ignorance (478c13-d4). So opinion is related to that which is between what is and what is not (478e1-6). Now what the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing think of are of such nature as to be and not to be (479a5-d6). So their thought is opinion (479e1-6).

One key premise in Socrates' argument above is that opinion is different from knowledge, which he tries hard to prove; for if opinion and knowledge were the same, they would be related to the same thing, what is. His proof and argument go like this. First, opinion and knowledge are faculties (477d7-e3). The principle of individuation of faculties is what they are related to and what they accomplish: if two faculties are related to different things and accomplish different things, they are different faculties(477c6-d6). Since opinion is fallible and knowledge infallible, they accomplish different things; since they accomplish different things, they are different faculties(477e6-478a2); and since they are different faculties, they are related to different things (478a12-b2).

Two questions naturally arise: First, what is meant by "what is"? and, second, even if knowledge and opinion accomplish different things, why can they not be related to the same things? About the first question, the traditional interpretation<sup>7</sup> takes "what is" in the sense of what exists. Three different uses of being, however, are commonly distinguished: they are the existential use, the predicative use, and the veridical use of being.<sup>8</sup> If so, to take "is" as "exists" may not be necessary, and what Socrates has in mind may be the predicative or the veridical use of "is". Before we see more closely the various possible interpretations of what is, I should explain the three different uses of "to be". The second question will be examined along with the possible interpretations of what is.

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<sup>7</sup> Cross and Woosley, *op. cit.*

<sup>8</sup> Cf. C. Kahn, 'On the Theory of the Verb "To Be".'

## 2. The Three Different Uses of “To Be”

The first use of “to be” is existential. For example, “there is God.” In this example, “is” is used in the sense of existence. The second use of “to be” is predicative. For example, “Socrates is tall.” In this example, the function of “is” is to connect the subject “Socrates” and the predicate “tall” together. The third use of “to be” is veridical. For example, “Tell it like it is.” In this example, no specific predicate is understood after “is”, but “is” stands for “is the case” or “is true.” The underlying subject for the veridical use of “is” is a sentence, which can be the case, rather than a noun or a noun phrase. For example, “It is the case that Socrates is tall.”

These three uses of “to be” are distinct. First, the predicative use of “to be” does not necessarily imply the existence of a subject. So we can say, for example, “There is not Pegasus who is a winged horse.” For even if Pegasus is a winged horse by definition, it does not follow that there is such a creature in the world.<sup>9</sup> Secondly, the predicative use of “to be” does not necessarily imply the truth of a sentence. For example, we can say “It is not the case that Pegasus is a winged rabbit.” Thirdly, the veridical use of “to be” does not necessarily imply the existence of a subject. Thus, for example, we can say, “It is true that Pegasus is a winged horse, but Pegasus does not exist.” So no two uses of “to be” are equivalent.

## 3. Possible Interpretations

### i. Vlastos’ Interpretation

As stated already, the traditional interpretation understands “what is” in Socrates’ argument primarily in the sense of what exists. According to this interpre-

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<sup>9</sup> This is partially an old Aristotelian thesis that essence does not imply existence for composed substances. Cf. Aquinas, *On Being and Essence*, Ch. V, Parag. 77.

tation, knowledge is related to what exists, opinion to what half exists and half does not exist, and ignorance to what does not exist. One major difficulty with this interpretation is to make sense of the notion of degrees of existence: especially to explain what it means to be half existent and half non-existent. Critics of the traditional interpretation, such as Vlastos, say that “degrees of it [existence] make no sense whatever.”<sup>10</sup> Vlastos thinks that “is” and “is not” should be supplied with a predicate F when they are used without such a predicate in Socrates’ argument at 477a-479d.<sup>11</sup> When a predicate is supplied, Socrates’ claim would be that knowledge is related to what is F, and opinion to what is F and is not F. How does Vlastos interpret the meaning of Socrates’ claim?

Although Vlastos denies the degrees of existence, he admits degrees of reality in Plato. Vlastos finds two senses of “real” (or “being”) for Plato. One sense of “real” (or “being”) is “cognitively dependable, undecieving.”<sup>12</sup> Thus to say that there are degrees of reality means that some predications are more cognitively dependable than others. Vlastos takes what is F, to which knowledge is related, as what is really (dependably) F, and what is F and is not F, to which opinion is related, as what is F but is not really (dependably) F. How are some predications dependable while others not? For example, predicating tallness of Simmias is not very dependable, while predicating oddness of three is much more dependable. The reason why predicating tallness of Simmias is not dependable is that Simmias is only contingently tall, and the reason why predicating oddness of three is dependable is that three is necessarily odd. In other words, three cannot be but odd, while Simmias could be short. So, according to Vlastos’ interpretation, there are on the one hand certain things which have their predicates<sup>13</sup> (or properties) necessarily, and on the other hand others which have their

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<sup>10</sup> G. Vlastos, ‘Degrees of Reality in Plato,’ p. 65. See also J Annas, *An Introduction to Plato’s Republic*, p.196.

<sup>11</sup> G. Vlastos, op. cit., p. 63, n. 21.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 63.

predicates (or properties) only contingently. The former are the objects of knowledge and the latter are the objects of opinion.<sup>14</sup>

The other sense of “real” (or “being”) which Vlastos finds in Plato is “reliably valuable”<sup>15</sup>. While what are cognitively dependable are objects of cognition (knowledge), what are reliably valuable are objects of a philosopher’s love. So what are real in this sense are lovable and beautiful as well. This sense “becomes most prominent when [Plato] thinks of the ‘really real’ things, the Forms, as objects of mystical experience.”<sup>16</sup> What are real in this sense are valuable, as Plato describes

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<sup>13</sup> A predicate is primarily a linguistic notion. However, we may loosely use an expression “predicate” as meaning a corresponding property possessed by an object.

<sup>14</sup> Vlastos says that what are true (or cognitively dependable) are primarily propositions, and derivatively things described by propositions (ibid., p. 59). For example, what is dependable is primarily a proposition that three is odd, and three is said to be dependable only derivatively from the dependability of the proposition that three is odd. In the actual practice of interpretation, however, Vlastos seems to mean by the cognitive dependability the dependability of predications, for he talks about the necessary connection between subjects and predicates, and the contingent relationship between subjects and predicates. After all, Vlastos does not seem to distinguish the dependability of propositions and the dependability of predications clearly. Maybe he is right if predication is the way of making propositions: predicating F of a subject is (necessarily) true if and only if it is (necessarily) true that the subject is F. An emphasis on propositions, however, may miss an important point if it suggests that propositions are basic constituents of reality. As propositions, a contingent proposition that Charmides is beautiful and a necessary proposition that the Beauty itself is beautiful are just two different propositions. But they share the same predicate “beautiful”, as Plato seems to intend. Thus the same predicate has very different relations with two different kinds of things (subjects): a necessary connection with one kind of things, and a contingent relation with another kind of things. So the same predicate F is dependable when applied to one kind of objects, and not dependable when applied to another kind of objects. None the less, whichever of propositions and predications are primary, cognitive dependability is an epistemological notion, and that is why the things described by predicates are said to be dependable only derivatively. Ontologically, however, those things described by predicates should be dependable in the primary sense; for they have their predicates (properties) dependably because of their being what they are. (Cf. Vlastos, ‘Degrees of Reality in Plato,’ pp. 69-70)

<sup>15</sup> Vlastos, ‘Metaphysical Paradox,’ pp. 49-50.

them, in the sense which “transcends the usual specifications of value, moral, aesthetic, and religious; it connotes more than goodness, beauty, or holiness, or even than all three of them in conjunction.”<sup>17</sup> So in this sense, certain things are reliably valuable and satisfying, while others leave us with dissatisfaction and make us move from one to another. How is the real in the first sense related to the real in the second sense? The happiness which the vision of Forms brings to philosophers is “also intellectual, since it marks a climactic point in the pursuit of knowledge.”<sup>18</sup> This is all Vlastos says: otherwise, the real in the second sense is “very different”<sup>19</sup> from the real in the first sense.<sup>20</sup>

## ii. Gosling’s Interpretation

Another major objection to the traditional interpretation is that, read in the existential use of “to be”, Socrates’ argument makes an assumption that opinion is related to what exists and does not exist, an assumption which the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing are not likely to accept. For it is not likely that they are going to admit such a dubious thing, i.e., what half exists and half does not exist, as that to which

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<sup>16</sup> Vlastos, ‘Degrees of Reality in Plato,’ pp. 63-4. What are real in the first sense and what are real in the second sense are extensionally different, for the former include, but the latter do not include, such *bona fide* Forms as Injustice and Ugliness.

<sup>17</sup> Vlastos, ‘Degrees of Reality in Plato,’ p. 64.

<sup>18</sup> Vlastos, ‘Metaphysical Paradox,’ p. 52.

<sup>19</sup> Vlastos, ‘Degrees of Reality in Plato,’ p. 63.

<sup>20</sup> Vlastos seems to think that Plato should have clearly distinguished the real in the first sense from the real in the second sense and “propounded the latter as a personal vision for which demonstrative certainty cannot be claimed.” (‘Metaphysical Paradox,’ p. 56) The same two dimensions of Plato’s understanding of Forms, a discursive understanding of Forms as things about which propositions and demonstrations are and an intuitive understanding of Forms as objects of vision, are often pointed out; for example, J. Stenzel, *Plato’s Method of Dialectic*, translated by D. J. Allen. These two dimensions are also sometimes pointed out by the difference between knowing that and knowing an object, or propositional knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance: cf. Cross and Woosley, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-1.



opinion is related.<sup>21</sup> But Socrates' argument, the objection continues, should not begin with such a controversial assumption which the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing are not likely to accept, since it, beginning from 476e7, is supposed to persuade them.<sup>22</sup>

Reading "is" in Socrates' argument in its veridical use, Gosling offers a degrees of truth interpretation.<sup>23</sup> According to him, knowledge is related to what is true, and opinion to what is (partly) true and (partly) false. As this is a veridical reading of being, what is true, or is not true, is a proposition rather than an object (a single object in the accusative).<sup>24</sup> What is true is a true account to answer a question, what X is, and

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<sup>21</sup> At this stage, 477a6-b1, Socrates' argument proceeds on a formal ground as noted by Fine, 'Knowledge and Belief in *Republic V*,' p. 125: it specifies what the objects of opinion should be like; but it does not say what opinion is, nor who have opinion. But, according to Fine, the merely formal characterization of the objects of opinion as what is and is not is objectionable for the sightlovers, if "is and is not" is taken in its existential use, because of the introduction of such dubious entities as what is half existent and half non-existent.

<sup>22</sup> This objection is found in G. Fine, *ibid.* The principle that Socrates' argument here cannot assume controversial premises unacceptable to the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing is called the condition of noncontroversiality by Fine, *ibid.*, p. 123. About the condition of noncontroversiality, see also J. C. Gosling, '*Doxa and Dunamis in Plato's Republic*,' pp. 120-2. The same kind of objection using the condition of noncontroversiality can be raised against Vlastos' predicative interpretation of Socrates' argument, too.

<sup>23</sup> J. C. Gosling, *op.cit.*, and also '*Republic V: ta polla kala etc.*' A degrees of truth interpretation, abbreviated as DT, is how Gosling's interpretation is called by G. Fine. See G. Fine, *op.cit.*, p. 126.

<sup>24</sup> This is called a contents analysis of knowledge (and belief), as opposed to an objects analysis, by G. Fine. *Ibid.*, p. 124. An objects analysis takes *that* to which knowledge is related as an object of knowledge which is expressed by a noun in the accusative as in "knowing a house." A contents analysis takes *that* to which knowledge is related as the content of knowledge which is expressed by a that clause as in "knowing that the house is blue." G. Ryle, in his classical paper, '*Plato's Parmenides*,' explains a contents analysis of knowledge as follows:

knowledge requires for its expression not just a name but a sentence or statement. And what a sentence or statement expresses always contains a

what is (partly) true and (partly) false is an account of X “which does not give us what X is, yet does not give us what is in no sense X.”<sup>25</sup> For example, an account that justice is the repayment of debts accounts for some just acts, but not for others: some other just acts are not repayments of debts (and also some other acts of repaying debts are not just). Such an account is “near the mark”: it is far better than another account, for example, that justice is a pair of spectacles. But it is *only* near the mark: it is different from the correct definition of justice, which must be a single unifying definition accounting for all and only just things.

The above second objection to the traditional interpretation can be applied to Vlastos’ predicative interpretation, too. According to Gosling,<sup>26</sup> a predicative reading of being makes Socrates’ argument assume that every object with which the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing are concerned is F and is not F (479a5-b2), but the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing cannot accept such a drastic assertion at the outset. For it is not obvious that, for example, a particular act of paying this debt, which is apparently just, is not just. This is an objection to an objects analysis<sup>27</sup> in general in the interpretation of Socrates’ argument. And that is why Gosling takes a contents analysis, that is, a veridical reading. Then how does Gosling read Socrates’ assumption at 479a5-b2 as an uncontroversial assumption? What is said to be true, or not true, is an account of something X, and not a particular object. An account of X, which the lovers

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plurality, at least a duality of distinguishable elements or factors. (p. 136)

Another name for contents is ‘internal accusative’(I. M. Crombie, *An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines*, vol. II, p. 57).

Both Fine and Gosling take a veridical reading of being, that is, a contents analysis of knowledge (and belief), and so their interpretations are considerably similar, especially in their criticisms of existential and predicative readings. I shall describe Fine’s interpretation after Gosling’s interpretation.

<sup>25</sup> J. C. Gosling, ‘*Doxa and dunamis in Plato’s Republic*,’ p. 125.

<sup>26</sup> J. C. Gosling, ‘*Republic Book V: ta polla kala etc.*’ pp. 118-9. See also Fine, *op.cit.*, p.125.

<sup>27</sup> For an objects analysis, see note 24.

of sights and the lovers of hearing offer, is true for some tokens of X, but not for others, and this is exactly what the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing want to say.

Who are the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing and what are they saying? According to Gosling, the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing are not just non-philosophers in general, but they are learners (475e1), lovers of crafts, and practical (476a10). In a word, they are the people who have something to say about justice, the beautiful, and others. For example, they do not attend festivals “merely to fill in time, like the Saturday cinema queues; but they would be more likely to be found at the Cannes Festival, studying the art.”<sup>28</sup> One of their discoveries will be that “objects of varied descriptions are beautiful,”<sup>29</sup> and they will think that a request for a single account of the beautiful is “unsophisticated and uneducated.”<sup>30</sup> They are practical people, and they give many accounts of X: one account for this X thing while another account for that X thing. Their accounts of X, although many, have “immediate relevance to behaviour.”<sup>31</sup> That is why they are very willing to admit that an account of X, which they offer, is true for some tokens of X, but not for others.

### iii. Fine’s Interpretation

Fine offers a different version of the veridical reading.<sup>32</sup> According to her, opinion is related to what is true and is not true, not in the sense that “each token belief [opinion] is ‘true and not true’,”<sup>33</sup> but in the sense that “the set of beliefs covered by the capacity [of opinion] -- contains true as well as false members.”<sup>34</sup> So there are not

<sup>28</sup> Gosling, op.cit., p. 121.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 122.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 121.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p.123.

<sup>32</sup> Fine calls her interpretation T. It is not clear why it is called T. I suppose that she means that her interpretation (T) is Gosling’s interpretation (DT) minus *degrees* of truth (D).

<sup>33</sup> Fine, op.cit., p. 126.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

degrees of truth, and every opinion is either definitely true or definitely false; but opinions as a set contain false as well as true members, while knowledge as a set contains true members only. Fine is much concerned with denying a stronger thesis of the two worlds theory: a thesis that the objects of opinion (the world of sensibles) cannot be known while the objects of knowledge (the world of Forms) cannot be opined.<sup>35</sup> One of her convictions is that a thing (object or proposition) can be both known and opined.<sup>36</sup> This is why she disagrees with Gosling's interpretation. Gosling's interpretation makes "the contents of knowledge and belief -- irreducibly different: knowledge will range over truths, and belief over partial truths."<sup>37</sup> This is "unintuitive"<sup>38</sup>, according to Fine. But, in Fine's interpretation, "the same proposition can be the content of belief and of knowledge."<sup>39</sup>

Socrates proposed to distinguish faculties by what they are related to and what they accomplish (477c9-d2). He says that if two faculties are related to the same thing and accomplish the same thing, they are the same faculty, and that if they are related to different things and accomplish different things, they are different faculties (477d2-5). This leaves two possibilities open: two faculties may be related to the same thing but accomplish different things, and two faculties may be related to different things but accomplish the same thing.<sup>40</sup> From an admission that knowledge and opinion accomplish different things (one infallible, and the other fallible), however, Socrates seems to

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., pp. 121-2.

<sup>36</sup> The *Meno* 97-8 suggests a thesis that what is believed becomes knowledge if it is accompanied by reasoning about the cause (*aitias logismos*). According to this suggestion, the difference between knowledge and belief is not in the objects or contents, but in the justification, grounding, or method by which one reaches a belief. We might say that Fine's interpretation is a *Meno* inspired interpretation of the *Republic's* epistemology.

<sup>37</sup> Fine, op. cit., p. 126

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p.128.

infer that knowledge and opinion are related to different things (477e6-478a5). What is he thinking? According to Fine, Socrates is saying, not that knowledge and opinion are related to different objects (or cannot be related to the same proposition),<sup>41</sup> but that the faculty of knowledge is related to a piece of knowledge, while the faculty of opinion is related to an opinion.<sup>42</sup> Thus interpreted, Socrates' claim is simple: knowledge has as its content a piece of knowledge and produces a set of truths, and opinion has as its content an opinion and produces a set of truths and falsehoods. Socrates does not distinguish knowledge and opinion by their different objects,<sup>43</sup> and, further, the same proposition can be a piece of knowledge when it is produced by knowledge, and an opinion when it is produced by opinion.

Fine is silent about the identity of the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing.<sup>44</sup> However, since she, unlike Gosling, does not limit opinion to accounts in answer to what X is, she seems to include a more general public among the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing. The lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing, since they do not recognize Forms, account for things in terms of observable properties. An account of X in terms of observable properties is unsatisfactory, however, since it accounts for some X cases but not for others. Since such an account is unsatisfactory, it is simply false. Reliance on such a false account naturally leads people to false as well as true opinions about X cases. This is how the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing are limited to opinion.

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<sup>41</sup> According to Fine, if Socrates' meaning were this, his argument would be invalid. For even if knowledge and opinion accomplish different things, it does not follow that they are related to different objects (or different propositions). Knowledge and opinion may be related to the same thing but accomplish different things, like husbandry and butchery. See Fine, *ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 129.

<sup>43</sup> Nor by their individual contents, but by their contents as collectively seen as sets. That is to say, a set of contents of knowledge and a set of contents of opinion are different; but a member of the former set can be the same as a member of the latter set.

<sup>44</sup> At least in her paper, 'Knowledge and Belief in *Republic V*.'

After persuading the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing that they only opine, Socrates can introduce Forms as those “by reference to which one could acquire knowledgeable accounts.”<sup>45</sup> So the sensible world is not good enough to provide knowledge, and “all knowledge requires knowledge of Forms.”<sup>46</sup> But if one knows the true account of X by reference to Forms, one’s judgment about a particular X that X is Y, being based on the true account of X by reference to Forms, can be knowledge. And thus particulars, which are only opined by the lovers of sights and the lovers of hearing, can be known by the philosophers. And also philosophers at the stage of learning may only have opinions about Forms.

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 137.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

Kozi Asano, April 1994

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